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THE WISCONSIN EXEMPTION CLAUSE DEBATE
OF 1846: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
ON THE REGULATION OF DEBT
BERNARD

R.

TRUnLLo•

We live in a time of crisis for consumer bankruptcy. Despite good
economic times in the United States, an unprecedented number of
individuals and households are going bankrupt. Dramatic changes in the
distribution of credit have created new possibilities and pitfalls for the
consumer and worked fundamental changes in the profile and political
power of the creditor who stands to lose when the consumer goes broke.
These conditions have created an environment for reconsidering, in
Congress and in popular conversation, the appropriate measure of relief
that the laws of the United States should afford to an individual debtor.
The purpose of this short Article is to give our contemporary crisis
some historical perspective. A central feature of U.S. consumer
bankruptcy policy has been the idea of the ''fresh start": filing bankruptcy
is to be a new beginning for the debt-laden consumer. To restore the
debtor as a potentially productive member of the economy, the bankruptcy
process must allow the debtor to retain a suffici~nt level of basic
resources. Implicit in the fresh start approach is the notion that legal
institutions should attend to the economic and structural facets of debt
(Le. create conditions that will get the debtor back on her feet and into
the economy as soon as possible), leaving scrutiny of the moral aspects
of debt to other institutions more competent to the task. The present
crisis challenges us to ask how conmlitted we,_as a society, should remain
1
to this idea of the fresh start.
To deternline whether we should reaffirttl our social COJlllnitment to
the fresh start, it may be useful to remind ourselves of why such a policy
was chos_en in the first place. There_was a time when the fresh start was
not an enshrined objective of our laws on debt collection, but instead
merely one of a number of directions that society could take. This essay
•
Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. A.B., 1988_,
Princeton University; J.D., 1992, Yale Law School. Thanks to Chris Dickerson, Arthur
McEvoy, Michael Morgalla, Gary Rowe, Victoria Trujillo and William Whitford.
1.
See William C. Whitford, Changing Definitions of Fresh Start in U.S.
Bankruptcy lAw, 20 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 179 (1997)(describing eroding commitment to
goal of fresh start) .
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considers such a time by taking a close look at a debate over a proposed
clause that occurred at Wisconsin's Constitutional Convention of 1846.
The clause, which would have exempted some debtor's property from the
collection efforts of creditors, was among the first "exemption'' laws
considered in the United States. Study of the Wisconsin Exemption
Clause Debate of 1846 shows that the eventual selection of the fresh start
was not the inevitable destiny of a nineteenth-century frontier population,
but rather a deliberate policy choice, made for reasons that may or may
not remain persuasive today.
By reviewing the Wisconsin Exemption Clause Debate of 1846, this
Article hopes simply to e·stablish that a central question of nineteenthcentury Wisconsin debt regulation resembles a central question in our
contemporary conversation: na1nely, should the law treat debt primarily
as. a moral or an economic problem? Giving historical perspective to a
contemporary occasion of choice is not, of course, the same thing as
making an argument that we should strengthen or weaken our present
commitment to the fresh start and the particular approach to the law of
debt collection that it entails. But re-visiting one foundational moment of
bankruptcy law may help clarify our thinking as. we confront .another.
Finally, this Article will conclude with some tentative thoughts
comparing the contemporary crisis in bankruptcy to another crisis
presently occurring in the. field of immigration, as well as some equally
tentative thoughts regarding "debt" as .a useful organizing concept for
analyzing U.S. law.
.

.

.

.

I. CONTEMPORARY CRISIS IN BANKRUPTCY LAW
•

Federal laws affording bankruptcy relief to debtors are receiving a
terrific amount of attention these days. Perhaps there is a ron1antic reason
for this renewed interest, as lawyers make ready to celebrate tbe twentieth
anniversary of the enactment of the B.ankruptcy Code of 1978 ("Code'').
A more mundane, but perhaps realistic reason for boundless energy of the
bankruptcy reform movement is the fact that bankruptcy petitions are
soaring, and this in an economy that most agree is doing well. The
Administrative·Office of U.S. Courts reported that there were more than
1.4 million bankruptcy petitions filed in the calendar year 1997, with
2
filings by individual consumers accounting for 1.35 million of the total~
For a short-term perspective on these numbers, consider that the number
2.
See Breaking News
<http://www .nytimes.com·> .
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of filings increased 26% from 1995 to 1996, and increased ,another 19%
4
from 1996 to 1997. For long-term perspective, consider that last year's
consumer filings represent a 742% increase over the consumer filings of
5
twenty years ago when the Code was new.
Numbers like these require some explanation. One likely -reason for
the explosion in consumer bankruptcies is the explosion in the extension
of credit by lenders to "subprime" borrowers; that is, people whose low
income, youth, prior credit history or other factors make it more likely
that they would default on the loan. The number of subprime loans
(mainly in the form of credit cards issued to high-risk. borrowers)
increased as lenders realized that charging higher interest rates created a
handsome profit even after writing off the loans that went bad.
Corresponding with this market reality is the political reality that
unsecured lenders (i..e., entities who lend money without having the
borrower pledge some property as collateral), who do most of the
subprime lending, are now, in stark contrast to the recent past, quite well
organized and capable of assuring Congressional responsiveness to their
concerns .
Prior to 1978, when the Code was enacted, the profile of a typical
unsecured lender resembled the comer grocer. A borrower would wander
down Main Street, doing business on credit with the butcher and the
6
baker and the candlestick maker. When the borrower went bust, such
merchants had very little recours,e~~ Because unsecured lenders were small
and dispersed, and each had relatively few dollars at stake in any potential
default, they had very limited political power. The Code reflects this
imbalance on unsecured lenders vis-a-vis secured lenders (such as banks
that loan money by using the borrower's car or house as collateral).
Now, the profile of the typical unsecured lender looks more like
7
CitiBank. When a borrower wanders down Main Street today, she uses
her credit card to fund her purchases, thus creating a debt owed not to the
individual merchant, but rather to the bank or financial institution whose
DaJlle is on the credit card. Now when the borrower goes bust,. it is a
•

3.
See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT at ii
(1997)[hereinafter NBRC REPORT].
4.
See Breaking News from A. P., supra note 2.
S.
See NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at ii.
6.
There were, of course, plenty of ,credit cards in circulation prior to 1978,
along with a good concentration of unsecured debt owed to small loan companies. The
difference between the nature of unsecured consumer debt prior to 1978 and today is a
(perhaps dramatie) difference of degree rather than a difference of kind. See generally
TERESA SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS (1989).
7.
Perhaps to be re-christened "CitiGroup" after its merger with Travelers'
Insurance. See WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1998·, at 1.
'

·,

'
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relatively small number of well-financed and highly organized lenders that
stand to lose a lot of money.
Whatever the causes behind the explosion in consumer bankruptcies,
attention has focused on whether filing for bankruptcy offers "too much
relier' to the individual debtor. The debate about whether the law affords
debtors too much relief goes like this: Creditors claim that debtors filing
for bankruptcy feel too little pain, and so are turning to bankruptcy as a
sort of "financial planning" tool, as the first recourse. Behind this is the
assertion that bankruptcy has lost its ''stigma," and that the law should be
refortned to restore the negative moral charge to a decision to file for
8
bankruptcy. Those who support a higher level of relief for debtors
believe that, while the accumulation of debt may well have implications
for personal morality, the ·u.S. Congress and other institutions of the state
should limit their treatment to the economic and structural aspects of debt
9
regulation; allowing the debtor enough basic resources to return to the
financial fray on firtn footing after the bankruptcy will benefit the entire
economy.
Having sketched the contours of the contemporary debate, let us now
tum to the events of 1846 Wisconsin.
II.

THE EXEMPTION CLAUSE DEBATE OF THE

1846 CONVENTION

When delegates from around the Territory of Wisconsin gathered
together in 1846 to write a Constitution, two members of the body came,
as it were, from different worlds. The member from Racine County was
Marshall Strong, who was 33 at the time the convention. Strong was the
son of a judge, born in Amherst, Massachusetts and educated at Amherst
College. He became a lawyer and moved to the Wisconsin territory in
1836. He was elected to the Territorial Council, a body organized for the
purposes of revising the territorial laws in anticipation of statehood. In
January of 1846 Gust a few months prior· to the events I shall describe),
8.
The debate in the United States House of Representatives prior to the
overwhelming passage of a bankruptey reform bill was replete with language that sought
to "moralize" debt by legal means. See Katharine Q. Seelye, House Passes Bankruptcy
Reform Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 11., 1998, at A22 (quoting Representative Scott Mcinnis,
R. Colorado: "[This bill] represents another example of this Congress's efforts to
encourage individual responsibility. We will re-notify people that they do need to be held
accountable for their debts that they. have accumulated. We will remind them about .
keeping their word. We will remind them about 'Don't go out and spend :money that you
don't have.' . . . If you can't afford it (he said, nearly shouting],_don't buy it.").
9.
See Calvin Woodard, Reality and Social Reform: The Transition from l.AissezFaire to the Welfare State, 12 YALE L.J ~ 286 (1962) (des_cribing nineteenth·century
reevaluation of poverty from a problem of personal morality to an economic problem that
could be addressed with state action).
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while he was away attending to the work of the Territorial Council, his
10
wife and children died in a fire that also destroyed his home in Racine.
The tragedy evoked the sympathy of the entire Territory. Popular
acclamation compelled Strong to stand for election as Racine County's
delegate to the Constitutional Convention, and he was elected
overwhelmingly. Strong ultimately resigned his position as delegate to
the Convention (in large part because of the disagreement over the
Exemption Clause that we shall consider), and subsequently used all of
11
his efforts to secure the defeat of the Constitution.
After his
resignation from the Convention, Strong may have lost some of the
12
confidence of the populace, and gradually faded from public life. He
died at his home in Racine in 1864.
The member from Rock County was David Noggle. Unlike Marshall
Strong, .David Noggle was no a child of privilege. Born of pioneer
parents in Pennsylvania, Noggle spent time working in a factory in New
York City and as a fartn hand in Illinois. Self-educated, Noggle studied
law in his free time while working on the farm. Noggle was admitted to
the bar and began his practice in Beloit in 1839.13 Thirty-seven years old
at the time of the Convention of 1846, Noggle was one of the more
influential and original thinkers of the Convention. After the Convention, ·
Noggle's career went in the opposite direction from Strong,s.: in 1869,
10.
See THE CONVENTION OF 1846, at 793 (Milo M. Quaife ed.
1919)[hereinafter QUAIFE, CONVENTION].
11.
See Marshall Strong, Speech to the Territorial Legislature Opposing the
Ratification of the Constitution (February 5, 1847), reprinted in THE STRUGGLE OVER
RATIFICATION 235-62 (Milo M. Quaife ed. 1920)[hereinafter QUAIFE, RATIFICATION}.
In April of 1847, after four months of intense debate, the proposed Constitution was voted
down by 59% of the population. See THE AITAINMENT OF STATEHOOD v-vii(Milo M.
Quaife ed. 1928)[hereinafter QUAIFE, ATIAINMENT}; QUAIFE, RATIFICATION, supra. at
698. In December of that year delegates met in Madison to draft a second attempt at a
Constitution, which contained a somewhat weaker version of an Exemption Clause. See
QUAIFE, AITAINMENT, supra, at 44-47. The second draft of the Constitution was ratified
by 74% of the popular vote in March 1848. See id. at vii. The current Wisconsin
Constitution still contains exemption language: "The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the
necessary comforts of life shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable
amount of property from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability hereafter
contracted." WIS. CONST., art~ I, sec. 17.
12.
Strong's performance at the Convention, even prior to the debate over the
proposed Exemption Clause, seemed to have diminished his popular credibility. See
Letter from the Convention to the Platteville Independent American (November 8, 1846)
reprinted in QUAIFE, RATIFICATION, supra note 11, at 118-19 ("Marshall M. Strong, who
was a prominent man and regarded as certain of high prefertnent in the new order of
things when we assume state sovereignty . . . is now considered by all as effectually laid
out and to be trusted by none . . . .").
13.
See QUAIFE, CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 784.
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Noggle was appointed by President Ulysses S. Grant to be Chief Justice
of the Territory of Idaho. Noggle served in that capacity until 1874 and
14
died four years later.
On December 7, 1846 the member from Racine County and the
member from Rock County clashed bitterly over the issue of whether an
Exemption Clause should be included in the organic law of the nascent
15
state of Wisconsin.
As described by Strong, the provision under
discussion provided that "forty acres of land, to be selected by the owner,
shall be exempt from sale on execution issued on judgment obtained for
16
debt contracted after the adoption of this constitution. "
Such a provision, exempting or shielding some of a debtor's property
from being seized and sold by creditors looking to rnake good on the
debt, is now a quite conunon feature of the debt collection laws of the
17
states and of federal bankruptcy law. But in 1846, an exemption law
18
was something new.
Strong began his passionate opposition to the
proposed ~xemption Clause by suggesting that the provision was novel
and untried, noting that "(n]othing similar . . . can be found in the
constitutions of any state except Texas, and surely we will not go to that
noted asylum for all the desperadoes in the country for examples of public
19
morals and correct laws on the collection of debts. "
•

14.
See id. at 785.
15.
Territorial Governor Henry Dodge issued a proclamation formally declaring
the popular ratification of the Wisconsin Constitution in April 1848, and one month later
Congress passed an act admitting Wisconsin to the United States. See QUAIFE,
ATIAINMENT, supra note .11, at vii.
.
16.
QUAIFE, CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 649. A neighboring section of the
proposed constitution, treating the property rights of married women, was perhaps equally
controversial. See id. at 631.
17.
See; e.g., NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 118 (compiling state and federal
exemption statutes).
18.
At the time of the 1846 Wisconsin convention, only the Texas Constitution,
ratified in 1845, contained exemption language. A Mexican statute of 1829, following
Spanish law, had made exemption laws applicable to the Mexican territory of Texas, and
Texas enacted a similar statute for itself ten years later. See Joseph W. McKnight,
Protection of the Family Home from Seizure by Creditors: The Sources and Evolution of
a Legal Principle, 86 SOUTHWESTERN HIST. Q., 369, 369 (1983). Besides Texas, the
states of Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama and Florida all had exemption legislation prior
to 1846. See McKnight at 396, n.81. See also Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the
Individual Debtor-And a Modest Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32
CATH. U. L. REV. 810 (1983).
19.
QUAIFE, CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 64748. See also McKnight, supra
note 18, at 393 ("The American financial crisis of 1837, which precipitated the movement
of so many distressed debtors to Texas, was a likely catalyst to the 1839 Texas enactment
[of exemption legislation].") .
•

•

•
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•

Aside from its novelty, Strong believed that the Exemption Clause
would amount to a constitutional license to fraud, calling it the "knave's
20
magna carta. '' So Strong opines from the floor:
Suppose a man in embarrassed circumstances residing in some
town in the state of New York near a farmer worth some five
thousand dollars. Under some pretence he procures his
endorsement to that amount. Having obtained the, money, and
read our glorious constitution, and converted his property into
cash, he comes to Wisconsin and purchases a valuable flouring
mill and the forty acres upon which it stands. Soon the farmer
is compelled to pay the endorsed notes; his property is, all sold
for that purpose-; his wife and children are turned out upon the
world, destitute and penniless. He follows his worthy neighbor
to Wisconsin, ascertains his place of residence, calls upon him,
and finds him sleek~ contented, surrounded with all the luxuries
of life-, and perhaps exceeding polite,withal. But the farmer is
inforn1ed that it is not convenient for the man to pay him then.
He calls upon a constitutional lawyer to ascertain what remedy
he has, and the lawyer very gravely says to him ''Sir, the law furnishes you with no remedy. Our wise men
in the days when the constitution was n1ade anticipated such
cases as these and have expressly provided that your worthy
friend shall be protected in the enjoyment of what he has.
Possession was for1nerly only nine points in the law, but it is
now ten. The reason of the law is this, that every n1an should
be protected in holding what he has in his own possession, no
matter how he came by it, for lawsuits to ascertain these
conflicting rights are very expensive. Besides you should not
repose confidence in any of the hun1an race, and as it seems you
21
have, you are therefore justly punished therefor. "
•

The upshot of such a law that privileges debtors at the expense of
creditors, according to Strong, is bloodshed: "Pass this act, and I predict
22
that violence and murder will abound. "'
Strong also makes an argument about the long-term effects of an
Exemption Clause upon the system of credit:

20.
21.
22.

QUAIFE, CONVENTION,

/d. at 650-51.
/d. at 65 1.

supra,note 10; at 657.
•

•
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No matter how much property a man may have, or what kind
of property it may be, so long as he is able to convert it all into
a valuable forty acre tract, which will be exempt from
execution, no man can trust him without knowing that it is in
the debtor's power at any time to deprive him of all legal
remedy to collect the-debt. The consequence is, then, that at
one fell swoop you destroy all credit. . . .

. . .. .

•

. . . [C]redit is not only the bond, but the distinguishing
23
mark of civilized society.
Strong's opposition culminates in a promise: "Sir, I dare not vote for
this section! I will not vote for the constitution if it contains it, either
here or at the polls. But, on the contrary, w~ll spare neither time, or
exertions, or means to defeat it." In fact, on the afternoon of December
7, 1846 (moments after Strong's speech in opposition and David Noggle's
response) the Convention voted 61 to 34 in favor of the article including
24
the Exemption Clause. Immediately after the vote, Marshall Strong
25
resigned his delegacy and returned to Racine to mount his opposition.
What explains Strong's desperate tone? Why does he put his back
to the wall on this issue? Perhaps one thing on Strong's mind was the
phenomenon summed up in the phrase "Shays' Rebellion," a series of
events that showed the shocking side of a Populism gone bad. Daniel
Shays had been a captain during the U.S. Revolutionary War. After the
26
war, Shays returned to his Massachusetts home deeply in debt. The
country was tom by a post-war depression that had robbed the currency
of much pf its valu.e. Shays and his followers (many of whom were also
23.

24.
'

25.

/d. at 652-53 ..
/d. at 670.
See id. at 673. Strong's resignation was described five days later by the

.Madison Democrat newspaper as a "political suicide." QUAIFE, RATIFICATION, supra
note ll, at 144.
Shays' situation was typical of his countrymen. As one Massachusetts farmer
26.
opined in 1786:
What are the present state of facts as they represent the yeomanry of this
Commonwealth? Our taxes are so high, together with calls of a private
nature, that our stock and cattle are greatly diminished .... the greater part
then of those who gloriously supported our independence now find their
moveables vanishing like empty shades, their lands sinking under their feet.
Massachusens Ga,zene (October 20, 1786), reprinted in DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS'
REBELLION 36 (1980). Szatmary describes the post-Revolutionary War squeeze British
merchants of manufactured goods put on U.S. retailers of those goods for specie, and the
corresponding increase in debt actions for specie brought against the yeomanry. See id.
at 19~36.

•
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indebted veterans of the Revolutionary War) rose in August of 1786 and
shut down the courts in Northampton so that debtors could not be tried
and imprisoned. Shays and his men then broke up the Massachusetts
Supreme Court in Springfield in an attempt to avoid being tried for
treason, and ultimately captured the state arsenal. The federal army
intervened in February of 1787, leading to the capture of Shays and the
end of the Rebellion. Many historians look to Shays' Rebellion, seen as
evidence of the unsustainable nature of the Confederation, as the
proximate, cause of the federal constitutional convention that met in
27
Philadelphia beginning in the summer of that year.
One condition that made Shays' Rebellion possible may strike a
familiar chord with the observer of our own contemporary debt crisis:
namely, the depersonalization of the relationship between debtor and
creditor. In the time of Daniel Shays, promissory notes, which could be
assigned and transferred among creditors, were just beginning to replace
"book debt, as the chief mode of credit transactions. As described by
historian Jonathan Chu, book debt was the
delineation of a series of mutual promises and obligations
rendered in precise economic terms and carried in a merchant's
account book.
The process by which book debt was
accumulated denoted a constant pattern of interaction and a
constant ebb and flow of credit and debit. Payable on demand,
book debt was a legally enforceable economic obligation, but it
might go years without settlement or collection since it also
represented ties of social relationships.
Under these
circumstances repayment rested upon the trust of the creditor
and the ability of the debtor to provide labor or goods when the
28
occasion arose over a lifetime.
·
Promissory notes, on the other hand, "could change hands at a dazzling
and confusing, rate. . . . [P]romissory notes facilitated economic
27.
So wrote editor Benjamin Russell in the Massachusetts Sentinel shortly after
the establishment of the federal Constitution:
In investigating the causes which gave life to the happy form of government
which we shall ere long be under, the Historian will not forget the era of the
late insurrections in this Commonwealth. The insurrections . . . must be
considered as the causes of bringing in existence, at a much earlier period
than would otherwise have been, the [federal] government.
Quoted in Robert A. Gross, The Uninvited Guest: Daniel Shays and the Constitution, in
IN DEBT TO SHAYS: THE BICENTENNIAL OF AN AGRARIAN REBELLIONS (Robert A. Gross
ed. 1993).
28.
Jonathan M. Chu, Debt Litigation and Shays' Rebellion, in IN DEBT TO
SHAYS: THE BICENTENNIAL OF AN AGRARIAN REBELLION, supra note 27, at 82.
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transactions; but in so doing, they also eliminated the moderating effects
29
of multifaceted social relationships when hard times struck. " Such a
phenomenon of "facelessness" is also an earmark of our own times, as
unsecured debt moves from the comer grocer to some corporation distant
and unseen.
Marshall Strong was undoubtedly influence_d by a· concern that the
same sort of pro-debtor populism that motivated the lawlessness of Shays'
Rebellion was returning to trouble the drafting of Wisconsin's organic
law. Indeed, less than one month before the Exemption Clause debate
and Strong's subsequent resignation, the Convention had considered an
article that would have c:onstitutionally prohibited all debt collection
30
laws:.
Sponsoring the proposed article was John Crawford, the
delegate representing Milwaukee County at the Convention. Crawford,
who was fifty-four years old at the time of the Convention, was a for1ner
military general who had gone into business. No friend of lawyers,
Crawford. advocated the abolition of debt collection law in part because
31
he thought that debt collection was a make-work industry for lawyers.
32
Aside from a few vintage nineteenth-century lawyer jokes, Crawford
also advanced the notion that abolishing debt collection laws would have
the beneficial effect of destroying the system of credit:

My views on this subject are that it will, in a measure, put a
stop to the credit system, which I consider a very great curse to
both debtor and creditor. But in the end it will have a glorious
effect, for it will place men upon their honor ... ~ [a]nd a[n]
honest man will have no trouble in getting all necessary
acconunodations. . . . The collection laws we shall have if this
resolution does not pass will destroy the natural confidence
between man and man, and the· debtor will say to the creditor
... "You hold a rod or iron over me, and you may make the
best use of it you can; I do not consider myself honorably
33
bound to pay it. "
29.
/d. at 82-83.
30.
See QUAIFE, CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 81 ("Mr. Crawford introduced
the following resolution; which was read to wit: 'Resolved, That all laws for the collection
of debts shall forever be prohibited within this state."').
31.
See id. at 341-42.
32.
"Mr. Chainnan, if in speaking of lawyers I am to be accused of descending
to low epithets, the-fault is not with me; I have to descend to low grounds to reach the
object of my search." JOHN CRAWFORD, SPEECH ON ABOUSHING· LAWS FOR THE
COLLECTION OF DEBTS BE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
(October 31, 1846), reprinted in id. at 348.
33.
JOHN .CRAWFORD, SPEECH INTRODUCING THE MEASURE TO ABOLISH LAWS
REGULATING THE COLLECTION OF DEBTS (October 10, 1846),_reprinted in id. at 94-96.
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Crawford's resolution was voted down on November 9, 1846, and
twelve days later Crawford offered a second provision to come to the aid
of the debtor: the first version of the Exemption Clause. The initial
formulation of the Exemption Clause, advanced by Crawford, directed
that the ''legislature shall provide by law for exemption from taxation and
execution five hundred dollars worth of household furniture, mechanics'
tools, farming utensils, professors' books, or other property belonging to
34
each family in this state. " A resolution introduced on the same day
sought to preserve from execution a parcel of land, and it was this
formulation of the exemption idea that received the stinging denunciation
35
of Marshall Strong on December 7, 1846.
At the conclusion of Strong's passionate oration, David Noggle rose
to take the floor in defense of the Exemption Clause. Noggle claimed
that he had
until this moment . . . designed casting a silent vote in favor of
the article; but, sir, when a provision, proposed to be made a
part of the fundamental law of the land, one founded in so much
equity and justice as is the one now before us, containing
principles in which the honest laborer, the poor n1an, and the
honest yeo
of the country are so deeply interested, I
cannot silently sit by and witness the sophisticated assaults of
Discussions about the role of credit in the developing economy and society were very
mucb at the forefront of the Exemption Clause debate. Compare Editorial of the
SOUTHPORT TELEGRAPH(December24, 1847)("Do away [with] your laws relating to debts
and bankruptcy
throw away your legal standards of right and wrong in regards to
matters of pecuniary deal and obligation; let integrity of character be the sole basis of
credit - and you will soon find a moral sentiment and discrimination springing up in
community [that will] furnish a better security for the honest and faithful discharge of
mutual obligations and for safety in business transactions, than any legal system of
coercion or regulation that human wisdom can devise.") with Editorial of the WISCONSIN
ARGUS (Madison)(December 7, 1847)("Four-fifths of our wealthy men were once poor.
Ask them how they became rich and they will generally tell you that they started on
capital obtained by credit, and that without credit they must have remained comparatively
poor. It is impossible to imagine any stroke of policy which would so effectually check
the growing wealth of a nation and so suddenly put it upon a retrograde movement as the
suspension of credit; for the poor, for the most part, would forever remain poor for want
of capital to aid industry, and the rich would become poor for want of industry to aid their
capital."), reprinted in QUAIFE, ATTAINMENT, supra note 11, at 65, 53.
JOHN CRAWFORD, REsOLUTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
34.
(November 21, 1846), reprinted in QUAIFE, CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 516.
See JOHN MANAHAN, REsOLUTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
35.
(November 21, 1846), reprinted in id. at 517 ("Resolved, that the legislature shall have
power to prohibit by law, from forced sale, a certain portion of the property of all heads
of families not to exceed 200 acres of land.")
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the gentletnan from Racine [Marshall Strong] upon the article
and its friends without endeavoring in my feeble manner to free
36
it from some of the abuses by him thus heaped upon it ..
Noggle's first strategy of defense is to sound the class themes that
typically mark discussions of the regulation of debt:
•

[The] [g]entlentan seem[s] very indignant at the idea of
providing for the poor man and not for the rich. Sir, it is too
true for the credit of this country, that the greatest portion of its
legislation is designed alone for the rich; the motto is too
conunon·, "Take care of the rich, and the rich will take care of
the poor." And now strange it is that when this article made its
appearance, raising but a feeble appearance in behalf of the poor
laborer, we should so suddenly hear the cry of "fraud, fraud,
fraud" from so tnany honorable members upon this floor, who
would not have been in the least suspected of having the
37
interests of the conunon people at heart.
Aside from this reference. to "class conflict,'' Noggle, in fact, may
have been hard pressed to present an account of when the law should
absolve debtors from paying their debts. After all, we conunonly take it
as a matter of simple justice that a person should pay What she owes. An
1847 discussion by the editors of Madison's Wisconsin Argus newspaper
thus put the question:
Upon what principle, then, is an exemption of property from the
just detnands of the creditor founded? We answer negatively
that it is not founded in the principle of justice. Justice requires
that a tnan should pay his debt simply because he owes it, and
not because he is able or unable. . . . The principle of justice
. . .. admits of no exemption, but pursues the debtor with its
inflexible demands to the last farthing he has, and holds him
38
bound for the balance, if there be a farthing still due.
'

36.
/d. at 658.
'37.
ld. at 664; see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA •s UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 326 (1988)(quoting a "Georgia scalawag delegate~ at the time
of Southern Reconstruction as saying, "This is a strife between eapital and labor,. between
the wealthy aristocrats and tbe great mass of the people.")
38.
Editorial, WISCONSIN ARGUS (Madison), Nov. 16, 1847, reprinted in QUAIFE,
ATTAINMENT, supra note 11, at 44-45 .
•
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But if exemptions are not a_matter of justice, then where can their
source be found? What lies opposite of "justice" on the ledger that would
yield relief to a debtor from collection on a debt that he deliberately
contracted? There _are at least three possible, and perhaps indistinct,
answers: mer:cy, equity, and a consideration of the social and economic
factors that may affect debtor and creditor behavior.
On the theme of umercy, '' the editors of the Wisconsin Argus
continued:
We answer affirmatively that [the exemption of property] is
founded in the principle of mercy, and in that alone. The
question then arises: To what extent does the principle of mercy
den1and exemptions? It may be answered in general terms that
its demand extends no further than to secure the debtor against
irmnediate suffering by the rigorous operation of the principle
of justice, and not even thus far when the arrest of justice would
operate unmercifully up_on the creditor. For example, if a man
be so poor that he has but two loaves of bread in the world and
honestly owes his neighbor one, and that neighbor has none, the
principles of both justice and mercy require that he should·pay
1•t .. 39

Such a calculus of mercy counsels a messy balancing of the straits of a
particular debtor against a particular creditor. A creditor who is a
hospitalized victim of the debtor's tort may win a greater pull on .one's
interpretation of mercy than the creditor who is a bank.
Perhaps the law's name for "mercy" is "equity." An example of the
law's use of equity to afford debtor relief is the "stay-law," which would
literally stay the processes of debt execution in order to afford temporary
relief to the debtor. Such laws were enacted in times of economic crisis
and, while courts would generally strike these laws as unconstitutional,
the laws would be effective long enough to afford the relief necessary to
40
mitigate the rough edges of the financial downturns. One Wisconsin
case (post-statehood) presents a good example of a court's use of equitable
reasoning. to justify such debtor relief. In Von Baumbach v. Bade, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a version of a stay-law, writing:
•

Although such changes are in general exceedingly unwise and
unjust, yet if from sudden and unlooked-for reverses or
39.

40
(l935).

!0

Id. at 45.
.
See CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY lN UNITED STATES HISTORY 148
•

•
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.misfortune, or any other cause, the existing remedies become so
stringent in all or a particular class of actions that great and
extensive sacrifices of property will ensue, without benefit to
the creditor or relief to the debtor, a relaxation of the remedies
becomes a positive duty which the State owes to its citizens ..
. . In passing upon questions like the present, Courts must look
behind the statute itself and take notice of the causes which led
to its enactment; for otherwise, they would be unable to
determine whether its regulations are reasonable or not, or were
demanded by the state of the times or the financial situation of
the country. . . . I cannot say that the delay occasioned by it is
so great or so unreasonable that it so obstructs or embarrasses
proceedings for foreclosure on the part of the mortgagee as to
41
make it under any circumstances unconstitutional and void.
The legislative enactment and judicial preservation of such stay-laws
seems a sort of inexact "legal override" to the demands of justice written
42
across the face of the contract between debtor and creditor.
A final justification for debtor relief lies in the scheme of incentives
that it provides to shape debtor behavior. In his defense of the Exemption
Clause, David Noggle touches on the idea that giving debtors a fresh start
will liberate them to be productive members of society in a way that
redounds to the conunon good: "The gentletttan from Racine says he
believes [the Exemption Clause] willtnake knaves and rascals. Sir; I
believe it will tend to elevate the poor; it will level them up instead of
down; it will tend to 111ake the lower classes of conununity Independent,
43
high minded, and honorable citizens. " Thus, the essence of the "fresh
start'' idea: When people are saddled with debt, they lack incentive to be
productive. For a debtor who is indebted past a certain point, the
question becomes, ''Why?,': Why go to work? Why come up with
ideas? Why struggle and strive when the debtor knows that her fate is
dictated by her circumstances? When that debtor, on the other hand, is
liberated from the debt that had kept her down, she becomes free to create
and produce in a way that benefits the entire conununity.
The fresh start redounds not only to the economic productivity of the
debtor, but also to her personal dignity. Noggle, demonstrating his
personal familiarity with the debtor class, makes the point:
9 Wis. 559 (1859); see also Warren~ supra note 40, at 88-89.
See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA:
INSOLVENCY-, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900 (1974); FONER,
supra note 37, at 212 and 326-27; Mark Bradshaw, ,The Role of Politics and Economics
in Early American Bankruptcy Law, 18 WHITilER L. REv. 739 (1997).
43.
QUAIFE, CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 664.
41.
42.

•
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The people have sense enough to know that the gentleman [Strong]
preaches false doctrine when he assumes that making men
independent tnakes rascals of them. They know, sir, that the very
germ of fraud is necessity. Remove man's dependence and you
remove in a great measure the inducements to dishonesty; but reduce
him to penury and want and still continue to oppress him and you
invite him to conunit fraud, knavery, and every other species of
robbery or dishonesty to sustain himself. Make your laws search the
poor man's granary, his closet, and his bedroom to satisfy its
44
execution, and you teach him to hide their contents ....
Debtor relief laws provide incentives for shaping not only debtor
behavior, but creditor behavior as well. Noggle thus contended that
protecting some of the debtors' assets through exemption will force
creditors to be more discriminating in the lending of money:
A fundamental law like the one now under consideration would
not, as the gentleman imagines, annihilate credit; but it would
no doubt annihilate that spurious, indiscriminating species of
credit that is as readily granted to the spendthrift and the loafer,
who never desire any property or means to be sheltered by the
exemption, as to the industrious individual; yet, to the same
extent that it enabled the former to obtain credit and
accommodation, it would exhaust the means and the substance
of the honest, prompt-paying debtor by making him pay (in the
shape of high prices) the losses occasioned by accommodating
45
the prodigal.
·
Noggle's claim is that a legal rule making collection more difficult for
creditors (by moving some debtor's assets beyond the creditor's reach)
will cause creditors to be more discerning of credit-worthiness when
46
lending money in the first instance. Perhaps along with providing a
44.
ld. at 666-67.
45.
Id. at 665.
46.
A similar question arises in the context of contemporary legislative initiatives
to add a "means test" requirement for allowing a consumer to file a Chapter 7 liquidation
instead of a Chapter 13 plan of debt reorganization and repayment. See, e.g., Congress
Might Make Debt Harder to Escape, BOSTON GLOBE, March 10, 1998, at A1. Such a
means test would shift the cost of determining the credit-worthiness of potential borrowers
from the lending institution (before the loan is made) to the court system (to evaluate
future capacity to pay once relief has been sought). Such a proposal begs the institutional
question of "Which institution (i.e., the Lender or the Court) is better equipped to
determine the credit-worthiness of a borrower?" See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR,
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1994).
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"fresh start'' for debtors, debtor relief laws may also provide. a "more
careful re-start" for creditors.
While"mercy'' and "equity'' present themselves as categories beyond
measure, perhaps the project of considering the incentives (for both debtor
and creditor) established by debtor relief laws is a science more given to
measurement and calibration. The calculation of when it is better to
execute the formal demands of the contract or when it is better to override
·the contract and afford extra-contractual relief to the debtor (calculation,
in other words, of when a debt is not worth paying) is the central task of
debt collection law.
The ultimate choice by Wisconsin (and eventually other states) to
embrace a fresh start policy in its debt collection laws was motivated, at
least in part, by a desire to champion economic growth. Much has been
written regarding such efforts by nineteenth-century legal actors that
47
shaped legal institutions to encourage entrepreneurship. The present
question, perhaps now better informed by a reading of history, is whether
we want to return to a posture of "moralizing" debt by legal means as we
tum to face the twentieth-first century.
•

•

III. DEBTORS AND IMMIGRANTS
This Article concludes with two bits of unfinished business. I have
asserted that ·"Debt" is a central organizing categ.ory in much of the law
of the United States. A central case, of course, is the law of bankruptcy,
which extends a "fresh start'' to the debtor based on the calculation that
the debtor can do more good, both for herself and for her community,
when released from financial burdens and restored to firm financial
footing.
The logic of the fresh start also animates inunigration law. The rules
. that govern the process of admitting migrants and investing them with
meaningful rights and remedies is a body of law that lies close to the
heart of this or any country's self-definition. We have heard that this
nation of immigrants was started, in ·part; by people fleeing the debts
(both financial and structural) of the old country. This nation then
crossed a continent westward as people fled debts incurred in the eastern
48
states and territories. When the United States exhausted its geographic
frontier (as Frederick Jackson Turner described it) near the close of the
nineteenth century, it embraced a legislative frontier in the fresh start
47.

See generally WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN

NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES

(1956).

48.
See, e.g .., McKnight, supra note 18, at 375 ("Moving West was a frequent
early nineteenth century .response to the series of economic crises in the new American
nation~").
·
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policies that were finally made part of continuous federal law in the
49
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The experience of the United States has
shown that inunigrants, if only released from the old-world burdens of a
stultifying class structure that guarded access to wealth, opportunities, and
hope, could raise up with their bare hands a great nation in a matter of
decades-.
Yet the war111 glow fades from our speech when the subject turns
from historical ruminations on "this nation of inunigrants" to
contemporary concerns of "inmugration control. 1.t Just as the rhetorical
power of the fresh start wanes for the New Debtor, it wanes also for the
New Immigrant, and it is an important project to establish why this is so~
The second bit of unfinished business pertains to the concept of
"Debt" itself. Much of the socio-legal history of the United States, both
the stories that do us honor in the telling and the stories that our troubled
consciences will not allow us to forget, can be organized along the
concept of Debt: The Debt that the working class owes to the propertied
class; the Debt that slaves owe to their masters; the Debt that criminals
owe to society; the Debt that inurligrants owe to the receiving country.
Much of the law of the United States, in its perfectly ordinary operation,
is about Debt. But the genius of the law of the United States is about
releasing captives of Debt from debts that are false, or from debts that are
not worth paying. It is the concept of the "debt not worth paying" that
merits much further attention.
•

49.
See FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(1947); see also FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, FRONTIER AND SECTION (1961); Margaret
F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, The Market for Deadbeats, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (1996) .
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